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 NOTICE, DESIGNATION AND SUBSTITUTION OF LEAVE REQUIREMENTS 
UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT1
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE LAW 
 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) imposes notice obligations on both 
employers and employees.  Employees must give their employer notice of their need for 
leave by providing an FMLA-qualifying reason for leave.2  Employees are not, however, 
required to use the words “FMLA” when asking for leave.3  Employees must also tell 
their employer if they wish to substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave.4  Finally, 
employees must provide their employer with two-days’ notice of their plans to return to 
work following leave.5   
 
Employers initially must give employees notice of their FMLA rights.6  Once an 
employee has requested leave, the employer then must (1) notify the employee if he/she 
is eligible for FMLA leave, (2) designate the employee’s leave as FMLA leave, if 
appropriate, and (3) tell the employee if paid leave must be substituted for unpaid FMLA 
leave.7
 
In 2002, in a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court altered the legal landscape of FMLA 
notice.  In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, 535 U.S. 81 (2002), the Supreme Court 
invalidated one remedial FMLA regulation related to notice, but expressly declined to 
rule on the validity of other notice and related remedy provisions.8  Notably, the Ragsdale 
dissent did validate these related individualized notice provisions, finding the regulations 
a reasonable exercise of the Department of Labor’s (DOL) authority.9  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This memorandum discusses the statutory provisions, legislative history and regulations 
governing FMLA notice, as well as select case law.  It includes a discussion of the impact 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Ragsdale on FMLA notice and remedy provisions.   
 
What did Ragsdale do? 
  
                                                 
1 Title II of the FMLA, governing most federal employees, is not discussed here, nor are any special 
provisions governing employees of local education agencies.  For a discussion of notice requirements 
related to intermittent and reduced schedule leave, see Workplace Flexibility 2010, Intermittent Leave and 
Reduced Schedule Leave Under the FMLA (2004). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.208, 825.302, 825.303. 
3 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.208(a), 825.302(c), 825.303(b). 
4 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2). 
5 29 C.F.R. § 825.309(c). 
6 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.300, 825.301. 
7 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.110(d), 825.208(a)&(c). 
8 Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, 535 U.S. 81 (2002). 
9 535 U.S. at 101-03. 
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The Ragsdale case reached the Supreme Court in 2002 after several district and circuit 
courts split over the validity of various FMLA notice and remedy regulations.10  
 
In Ragsdale, an employee with cancer took 30 weeks of leave under her employer’s more 
generous leave policy.11  Her employer did not notify her that her leave would count as 
FMLA leave.12  At the end of the 30 weeks, she requested additional leave, but the 
company denied her request.13  She was terminated when she did not return to work.14   
 
She sued under the FMLA, claiming that under the pertinent regulation, leave does not 
count as FMLA leave until the employer tells the employee it will.  She alleged that, 
because her employer had not given her notice, she was still entitled to an additional 12 
weeks of statutorily guaranteed FMLA leave.15  The district court and the Eight Circuit 
disagreed, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because 
it essentially required an employer to grant an employee more than 12 weeks of FMLA 
leave per year.16
 
The Supreme Court first found that the FMLA statute contains only one employer notice 
requirement – that employers post a notice of FMLA rights on their premises.17  In terms 
of penalties for employer notice violations, the Court noted that the FMLA imposes a 
small fine on employers when notice is not properly posted and provides generally for 
consequential damages and equitable relief when an employer interferes with the exercise 
of an employee’s FMLA rights. 18  The Court determined, however, that the FMLA 
statute neither requires notice of the designation of leave as FMLA leave nor specifies a 
penalty if such notice is not given.19  Rather, these requirements first appeared in the 
regulations promulgated by the DOL.20  These regulations provide that an employer must 
give written notice to an employee that an absence counts as FMLA leave and specify 
remedies if notice is not properly given.21
 
The Supreme Court ultimately did not rule on the validity of FMLA notice regulations, 
stating,  “…we do not decide whether the notice and designation requirements are 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Plant v. Morton International, Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000)(holding that 29 C.F.R. § 
825.208(c) was valid and prohibited an employer from designating FMLA leave retroactively when the 
employer had not provided proper notice to an employee that his paid leave was designated as FMLA 
leave); Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir 2000)(invalidated 29 C.F.R. § 
825.700(a) as contrary to the FMLA statute when it “always provides an additional twelve weeks of leave 
unless the employer specifically notifies the employee prospectively that she is using her FMLA leave.”). 
11 535 U.S. at 85. 
12 The employer did hold her position open and maintain her health benefits including paying premiums 
through most of her absence.  Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a). 
16 535 U.S. at 84-86. 
17 535 U.S. at 95; see also 29 U.S.C. §2619(a). 
18 29 U.S.C. §2619(a), §2615(a)(1) & §2617(a)(1). 
19 535 U.S. at 87. 
20 535 U.S. at 87-88. 
21 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d), 825.208(c), 825. 301, 825.700(a). 
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themselves valid or whether other means of enforcing them might be consistent with the 
statute.”22   Instead, it ruled merely on the regulation defining the remedy for failure to 
give required notice in the context of more generous employer policies.23  The Court held 
29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) invalid and contrary to the FMLA because it failed to tailor the 
penalty to the harm an employee actually suffered.24   
 
The Court found that the categorical nature of the penalty completely changed an FMLA 
cause of action by removing the employee’s burden to show a violation of his/her rights 
and to show the employee suffered harm because of the violation.25  In Ragsdale, the 
employee could not have acted differently (e.g., returned to work earlier, taken 
intermittent leave) had she received notice that her leave counted as FMLA leave because 
her medical condition precluded her from returning to work until long after the leave she 
received had ended.26  Although she would not have acted differently had she received 
notice and was not harmed by the lack of notice, the penalty in the regulation was “blind 
to this reality” and both denied her employer any credit for leave granted before notice 
and exposed it to litigation.27  
 
The Court also held that the regulation impermissibly amended the FMLA’s substantive 
entitlement to a total of 12 weeks of leave per year (a figure that resulted from a 
legislative compromise that DOL and the courts must respect) by giving those employees 
who do not get proper notice more than 12 weeks of FMLA leave.28  In addition, the 
Court noted that the penalty in the regulation was much harsher than the $100 fine 
Congress chose to assess on employers willfully violating the FMLA’s sole statutory 
employer notice requirement.29
 
The Ragsdale dissent, unlike the majority, addressed and validated the individualized 
notice requirements in DOL’s regulations.30  The dissent found that individualized notice 
both indicates to employees that the FMLA applies to them specifically, giving them the 
opportunity to take advantage of the leave and health and job restoration benefits the law 
confers, and facilitates planning by informing employees whether their FMLA leave and 
                                                 
22 535 U.S. at 96. 
23 535 U.S. at 96. 
24 535 U.S. at 90-95. 
25 Id. According to the Court, the regulation created an “irrebuttable presumption” lacking “empirical or 
logical basis” that all employees’ rights would be impaired by a failure to give notice, rather than tailoring 
the penalty to the harm done.  Id. 
26 535 U.S. at 90. 
27 535 U.S. at 90, 95. 
28 535 U.S. at 93-94. The Court also found that the regulation thwarted the statute’s clear language that 
nothing in the FMLA should discourage employers from adopting more generous policies. In enacting the 
FMLA, Congress did not want better leave policies already offered by employers reduced to the minimum 
standards of the FMLA because of burdensome administrative requirements.  The Court here found that a 
categorical penalty for a notice violation would do just that:  “The regulation imposes a high price for a 
good-faith but erroneous characterization of an absence as non-FMLA leave, and employers like Wolverine 
might well conclude that the simpler, less generous route is the preferable one.”  535 U.S. at 96. 
29 535 U.S. at 95; 29 U.S.C. §2619.   
30 535 U.S. at 97-98. 
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any employer-sponsored leave will run consecutively or concurrently.31  The dissent also 
found the remedial regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) reasonable and within DOL’s 
authority.32   In particular, the dissent found that the regulation penalizing employers who 
did not give notice would not create a substantive right to more than 12 weeks of leave in 
contravention of the FMLA statute, noting “…nothing requires an employer to provide 
more than 12 weeks of leave – an employer may avoid this penalty by following the 
regulation.”33
 
As a result of the court’s decision in Ragsdale, certain FMLA notice cases decided prior 
to Ragsdale may no longer be controlling law.   Likewise, going forward, it is unclear 
how broadly or narrowly courts will interpret the decision. For example, the Court’s 
decision may be interpreted by the lower courts in a number of ways:  
 
• Only the penalty provision at issue in Ragsdale (29 C.F.R. §825.700(a)) is 
invalid, but it is invalid only when individual harm cannot be shown. 
 
• Only the penalty provision at issue in Ragsdale (29C.F.R. §825.700(a)) is invalid, 
but it is invalid in all cases. 
 
• All penalties imposed by the regulations that create a substantive right to leave 
beyond that found in the statute are invalid. 
 
• All of the notice requirements in the regulations exceed DOL’s authority under 
the statute. 
 
Based on a review of cases post-Ragsdale (as discussed in more detail below), the courts 
thus far have generally required a showing that an employee was prejudiced or harmed by 
a lack of FMLA notice.34  Several courts have also extended the Supreme Court’s 
rationale to other FMLA notice and remedy provisions.35
                                                 
31 535 U.S. at 97-98.  The dissent also found the requirements reasonable because: (i) employees need to be 
aware of their rights and responsibilities under the FMLA, and (ii) nothing in the FMLA statute precludes 
an individualized notice requirement (e.g., the statute does not indicate that the requirement to post notice is 
meant to be the exclusive notice requirement for the law, and different notice requirements serve different 
purposes and thus may take different forms).  Id. at 99.  
32 535 U.S. at 101-103.  See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 371-72 
(1973)(“…where reasonable minds may differ as to which of several remedial measures should be chosen, 
courts should defer to the informed experience and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated 
appropriate authority.”).   
33 535 U.S. at 104.  The dissent also dismissed the argument that the notice requirement was onerous, 
noting that at most, the regulation just moves up the time that the employer must inform the employee what 
the employer already knows – that the leave is FMLA leave, and that the regulation would discourage 
employers from offering more generous policies, noting that the statutory provision seeking to encourage 
more generous policies does not deny DOL the power to promulgate any regulation that may have even a 
small discouraging effect.  Id. at 104-105. 
34 See, e.g., Katekovich v. Team Rent a Car of Pittsburgh, 36 Fed. Appx. 688, 691, 2002 WL 1288766 (3d 
Cir. 2002).; Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004); Wright v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 2004 WL 1087359 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Sims v. Schultz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 
2004); Felder v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22535 (E.D.La 2003). Courts 
generally do not find harm if the employee is unable to return to work at the end of the leave period. See, 
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What notice does the FMLA require from employers and employees? 
 
As noted, the recent Ragsdale decision may change the way that FMLA notice and 
remedy provisions are interpreted by employers, employees and the courts.  The 
discussion below highlights the types of notice required of employers and employees by 
the FMLA under a typical leave scenario, noting where Ragsdale may impact the law.  
 
Employer Notice of FMLA Rights 
 
First, the FMLA statute requires employers to conspicuously post a notice about the 
FMLA for their employees.36  This notice must include information on employee rights 
and responsibilities under the law and on how to file a complaint.37  An employer who 
fails to post such notice is subject to a fine of up to $100 for each willful violation of the 
law.38
 
The regulations add that the notice must be posted whether or not the employer has any 
FMLA “eligible employees” and requires the employer to provide the notice in the 
language in which large portions of its employees are literate (if not English).39  Under 
the regulations, employers must also provide general FMLA information in employee 
handbooks or, if the employer does not have a handbook, the employer must provide a 
separate written notice of the employer’s general FMLA policies and procedures.40   In 
addition, the employer must give the employee specific written notice explaining the 
specific expectations and obligations of the employee under the employer’s policies, and 
the consequences of failure to meet them.41  The employer must give this notice in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
e.g., Katekovich v. Team Rent a Car of Pittsburgh, 36 Fed. Appx. 688, 691, 2002 WL 1288766 (3d Cir. 
2002).  This result is consistent with another FMLA regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.214, which provides that if 
an employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position, the employee has no right to 
restoration to another position under the FMLA, although the Americans with Disabilities Act may apply. 
35 See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004), Phillips v. 
Leroy-Somer North America, et al, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5349 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); Felder v. Winn-Dixie 
Louisiana, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22535 (E.D.La 2003); Gurley v. Ameriwood Indus., 232 F.Supp.2d 
969 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
36 29 U.S.C. §2619(a). The committee reports on the FMLA did not address the notice posting 
requirements.  See H.R. Rep. 103-8(I)(1993), S.Rep. 103-3 (1993). Two House committee reports 
accompanied the FMLA – one by the Committee on Education and Labor dealing with Title I of the Act, 
and the other by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, dealing with Title II.  Because this memo 
focuses solely on Title I of the Act, all references to the House Committee Report refer to the report by the 
Committee on Education and Labor, unless otherwise noted. 
37 Id. 
38 29 U.S.C. §2619(b). The FMLA also contains notice provisions regarding medical certification of serious 
health conditions,  and notice provisions applicable to key (highly compensated) employees.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§2613, 2614(b) and Workplace Flexibility 2010, Eligibility for Medical Leave Under the FMLA (2004). 
39 29 C.F.R. § 300(a). 
40 29 C.F.R. § 301(a)&(b). The process for providing separate written notice follows that for specific 
written notice discussed below. 
41 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b). See also 60 Fed. Reg. 2219.  The specific written notice must, for example, tell 
the employee whether leave will be counted as FMLA leave or paid leave will be substituted for unpaid 
leave, whether medical certification or fitness-for-duty reports will be required, whether the employee is a 
key employee, and what health insurance liabilities exist.  Id. 
Workplace Flexibility 2010  © 
January 2005 
5
language in which the employee is literate at least the first time in each six-month 
period that an employee gives notice of the need for FMLA leave. 42  
 
DOL believed that the requirement that specific notice be in writing “ensures that the 
employee receives critical information and provides appropriate documentation of the 
information conveyed to the employee in the event of a dispute.”43  When promulgating 
the final regulations, DOL rejected suggestions that one generic notice applicable to all 
employees qualifies as specific written notice.44  Rather, DOL stated that “the intent of 
this notice requirement is to insure employees receive the information necessary to enable 
them to take FMLA leave,” and, therefore, “[i]t would be inappropriate to use a generic 
notice as much of the information may be employee specific….”45   
 
Finally, the regulations also add to the penalty for a violation of the posting requirement, 
providing that employers who do not post notice cannot take adverse action (including 
denying FMLA leave) against an employee who does not give notice of a need for 
leave.46  The regulations also add a penalty prohibiting employers who fail to provide 
written notice from taking action against an employee for failure to comply with the 
requirements in the notice.47  These regulations have been challenged following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale.48
 
In one well-known pre-Ragsdale case, the Ninth Circuit found that an employer’s 
compliance with general FMLA posting requirements did not satisfy its other notice 
obligations under the FMLA.49  Other pre-Ragsdale cases ruling on employer notice 
violations may no longer be controlling following the Ragsdale decision.50   
 
Following Ragsdale, when employers post FMLA information, include information in 
company handbooks and provide explanatory memos or orientation sessions on the 
FMLA, courts have generally ruled in favor of the employer when an employee claims an 
FMLA notice violation.51  Post-Ragsdale, courts have also required a showing of harm to 
the employee before finding a violation of FMLA posting or written notice 
requirements.52  
                                                 
42 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)&(c). 
43 60 Fed. Reg. 2220. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b). 
47 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(f). 
48 See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004); Felder 
v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22535 (E.D.La 2003). 
49 Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001). 
50 See, e.g., Wilson v. Lemington Home for the Aged, 159 F. Supp. 2d 186 (W.D.Pa 2001); Goodwin-
Haulmark v. Menninger Clinic, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D.Kan. 1999); Sims v. Alameda-Contra Costa 
Transit Dist., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D.Cal. 1998). 
51 See, e.g., Sanders v. May Dept. Stores Co., 315 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2003); Kelso v. Corning Cable Systems 
Intern. Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d 1052 (W.D.N.C. 2002). 
52 See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004); Phillips 
v. Leroy-Somer North America, et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5349 (W.D. Tenn.  2003); Felder v. Winn-
Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22535 (E.D.La 2003). 
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Employee Notice of Need for Leave 
 
The statute also requires employees to provide notice to their employers about their 
individual leaves.53  Employees must provide their employer with at least 30 days 
notice for foreseeable leave.54  If an employee needs to begin a leave in fewer than 30 
days, the employee must provide notice “as practicable.”55  
 
According to the committee reports, the 30-day advance notice requirement was to 
apply to “the extent possible and practical.”56 The reports explain that employees 
facing emergency medical conditions or unforeseen changes would not be precluded 
from taking leave if they could not give 30 days notice.57  Some examples of situations in 
which the 30-day employee advance notice requirement would not apply would be 
premature birth, sudden changes in a patient’s condition that require a change in 
scheduled medical treatment, or sudden availability of a child for adoption.58  
 
The regulations expand on what can be expected from employees when the 
foreseeable leave starts prior to 30 days or when the leave is simply not foreseeable.  
The statutory requirement of providing notice “as practicable” is understood by the 
regulations to mean “as soon as both possible and practicable.” 59   For foreseeable leave 
where it is not possible to give 30 days notice, the regulations state that this means 
providing notice within one or two days after the need for leave becomes known to the 
employee; for unforeseeable leave, the regulations also require that notice be given as 
soon as possible (generally one or two working days) after the employee learns of the 
need for leave.60 Notice need be given only one time.61  
 
The regulations also add that employees need not mention the FMLA by name in 
order to be considered as giving sufficient notice of their need for FMLA leave. 62   
According to the regulations, if an employee offers the employer a reason for leave that 
ultimately is found to be an FMLA-qualifying reason for leave, the employee’s request is 
sufficient.63   
 
Finally, the regulations add that if an employee does not give 30 days notice of 
foreseeable leave without reasonable excuse, the employer may delay the taking of leave 
                                                 
53 29 U.S.C. §2612(e). 
54 29 U.S.C. §2612(e)(1). 
55 Id. Special notice requirements apply regarding intermittent leave.55  See Workplace Flexibility 2010, 
Intermittent Leave and Reduced Schedule Leave Under the FMLA (2004). 
56 S.Rep. 103-3 (1993), at 22. 
57 Id. 
58 H.R. Rep. 103-8(I)(1993), at 38-39; S.Rep. 103-3 (1993), at 22. 
59 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(b). 
60 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a), 825.302(b)&(c), 825.303(a)&(b). 
61 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a). 
62 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a)(2), 825.302(a), (c)& (d) & 825.303(b). 
63 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a)(1)&(2), 825.302(c) & 825.303(b). This is especially true when an employee is 
requesting paid leave for a purpose covered by the FMLA, or seeks to extend a period of paid leave using 
unpaid FMLA leave.  29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a)(2). 
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by at least 30 days.64  In addition, if the employee gives no reasons, or no FMLA-
qualifying reasons, leave may be denied.65
 
The “as soon as practicable” notice standard has generated litigation. 66 For example, 
the Fifth Circuit found that an employee could meet the “as soon as practicable” standard 
when a change in her insurance coverage required her to reschedule surgery such that she 
was unable to give 30 days notice of her need for FMLA leave.67   The court there 
acknowledged that a non-medical reason – i.e., a change in insurance – could justify a 
shortened notice period under the FMLA.68  Other courts have permitted employees to 
give notice of their emergency/unforeseeable absences after they were supposed to have 
reported for work.69
 
The courts have also confirmed that an employee need not expressly mention the 
FMLA when providing notice of the need for leave.  According to the courts, no specific 
categorical rules define the content of the information an employee must give to the 
employer to provide notice that leave is for an FMLA reason and should be designated as 
FMLA leave; the facts and circumstances of each situation control.70  
 
Some courts have ruled in favor of employees, finding either that the employee need not 
specifically invoke the FMLA to qualify for FMLA leave, or that the employer failed in 
its obligation to ask for more information needed to make a designation.71   Other courts 
have ruled in favor of the employer, finding that the employer need not be 
“clairvoyant” or that the employee failed to provide reasons sufficient to qualify for 
FMLA leave.72  In one notable recent case, the Seventh Circuit found constructive 
notice when a model employee suddenly engaged in unusual behavior, like sleeping on 
the job.73  
                                                 
64 29 C.F.R.§ 825.304(b); 825.312(a). 
65 Id. 
66 When employees give timely notice, courts often simply acknowledge the fact. See, e.g., Conoshenti v. 
Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2004)(finding employee gave sufficient notice of 
need for leave when he notified employer two days after car accident that he was injured and his physician 
had indicated he would not be able to work for two weeks). 
67 Hopson v. Quitman County Hosp. And Nursing Home, Inc., 126 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 1997). 
68 Id. 
69 See, e.g., Mora V. Chem-Tronics, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 1192 (S.D.Cal 1998). 
70 See, e.g., Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1995); Collins v. NTN-Bower 
Corp., 272 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2001).  
71 See, e.g., Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); Haschmann v. Time Warner 
Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998); Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
72 See, e.g., Brennerman v. MedCentral Health System, 366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2004); Collins v. NTN-
Bower Corp., 272 F.3d 1006, 1008 (7th Cir. 2001); Satterfield v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 973 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
73 Byrne v. Avon Products, Inc., 328 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2003)(precluding summary judgment when genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether employee’s severe depression rendered him unable to work or to give 
employer notice of condition and whether employee’s change in behavior manifested by falling asleep on 
the job constituted constructive notice, given that notice was not “feasible” for person with major 
depression and was unnecessary even if change  in behavior was not enough to alert employer to need for 
medical leave). 
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In addition, the oft-referenced “ingrown toenail” case demonstrates the courts’ 
application of FMLA notice and leave designation requirements. In Manuel v. Westlake 
Polymers Corporation, the Fifth Circuit found that, for unforeseeable leave, an 
employee need not specifically mention the FMLA in order to invoke its 
protections.74  This was true even if the condition at issue might not ordinarily trigger the 
employer to seek more information about the underlying need for leave.75  
 
The employee in Manuel, who had a long history of absenteeism, was terminated under a 
no-fault attendance policy.  Over a month of her leave was taken for a procedure to 
remove an ingrown toenail and to recover from complications (an infection) from the 
procedure that required her to be on crutches.  Upon her termination, she filed suit under 
the FMLA claiming that these absences were unlawfully counted as an additional step in 
her employer’s no-fault attendance policy.76  
 
The district court concluded that when the leave is unforeseeable and the condition not 
the type that would normally trigger an employer to inquire further whether FMLA leave 
is needed, the employee must make some attempt to refer to the FMLA in order to benefit 
from its protections.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, declining to make categorical rules 
about the kinds of notice required for foreseeable and unforeseeable leave.77  It held that 
an employee need not make specific reference to the FMLA when requesting leave:  
“Congress, in enacting the FMLA, did not intend employees like June Manuel to become 
conversant with the legal intricacies of the Act.”78  The court noted that employers have 
protection against employees who seek to abuse the FMLA’s “generous provisions,” 
namely, the certification and second opinion procedures that permit further inquiry into 
the seriousness of the health condition.79  
 
Employer Notice of FMLA Eligibility 
 
The statute defines “eligible employees” under the FMLA, but contains no explicit 
requirements regarding notice of eligibility by the employer.80 
                                                 
74 Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995).This case was decided under the interim 
regulations, though the court discussed both the interim and final regulations. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. In the Appellant’s Reply Brief, the employee pointed out the infection “presumably could have led to 
gangrene and amputation if not treated properly.”  Reply Brief of Appellant, June Manuel, Manuel v. 
Westlake Polymers Corp. (filed April 21, 1995) at 7, available at 1995 WL 17116703.  FMLA absences do 
not count in no-fault attendance policy calculations.  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 
77 66 F.3d at 763-64. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 29 U.S.C. §2611(2). Under the statute, an “eligible employee” is one who has been employed for at least 
12 months by the employer from whom leave is requested and who has worked for at least 1,250 hours of 
service during the previous 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. §2611(2)(A).  The hours of service requirement 
relies on the legal standards set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §207.  29 U.S.C. 
§2611(2)(C).  Excluded from the definition are certain federal employees and employees who work for 
small businesses (specifically, businesses that employ less than 50 employees within 75 miles of the 
employee’s worksite). 29 U.S.C. §2611(2)(B). The committee reports explain the “eligible employee” 
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The regulations add that the employer must give timely notice that an employee is 
eligible for FMLA leave.81  If the employer does not give this notice, the employer 
cannot later challenge the employee’s FMLA eligibility, and, in certain cases, the 
employee is deemed automatically eligible and the employer may not deny FMLA 
leave.82  These regulations have been challenged following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ragsdale.83  
 
Prior to Ragsdale, the courts often applied equitable estoppel theory to determine 
whether an employee was eligible for FMLA leave when the employer gave faulty notice 
of eligibility.84  Post-Ragsdale, these FMLA eligibility notice and remedy provisions 
have been challenged in court.85
 
In addition, courts have applied Ragsdale to require a showing of prejudice or harm to 
the employee when an employer makes a mistake regarding the length or timing of 
leave periods.86  In some of these “employer mistake” cases, however, courts have relied 
on equitable estoppel theory to prevent employers from contesting an employee’s FMLA 
eligibility when they have erred.87  One district court also found an employer not 
protected for its erroneous calculations of a leave period even when an employee who 
was improperly terminated while on FMLA leave had informed the employer prior to the 
end of the leave period that she would not return to work until after the FMLA period 
expired.88  
 
Employer Designation of Leave as FMLA Leave 
 
The statute is silent with respect to designation of leave requirements.89
 
                                                                                                                                                 
definition in more detail, but also do not discuss any requirements regarding notice of FMLA eligibility by 
employers or employees.  See H.R. Rep. 103-8(I)(1993); S.Rep. 103-3 (1993). 
81 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d). 
82 Id. 
83 See, e.g., Gurley v. Ameriwood Indus., 232 F. Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
84 See, e.g., Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Associates, P.C., 274 F.3d 706 (2nd Cir. 2001); 
Scheidecker v. Arvig Enterprises, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (D. Minn. 2000).  Post-Ragsdale, these cases 
may not longer be controlling. 
85 See, e.g., Gurley v. Ameriwood Indus., 232 F. Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Mo. 2002). In addition, one district 
court has allowed an employee to use vacation time to become eligible for FMLA leave. Ruder v. Maine 
General Medical Center, 204 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D. Me. 2002). 
86 See, e.g., Farina v. Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Ariz. 2003); Medoza v. Micro Elecs., 
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15249 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2003). The courts often have found that if an 
employee could not return to work at the end of the FMLA leave period the employee could not show the 
requisite harm. See, e.g., Strykowski v. Rush North Shore Medical Center, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13206 
(N.D. Ill. 2003). 
87 See, e.g., Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2002); Gurley v. Ameriwood Indus., 
232 F. Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
88 Medoza v. Micro Elecs., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15249 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2003). 
89 The committee reports for the FMLA describe the FMLA’s notice provisions as “extensive,” but also 
contain no explicit discussion of designation of leave requirements.  See H.R. Rep. 103-8(I)(1993), at 38; 
S.Rep. 103-3 (1993), at 22.  
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Under the regulations the burden is on the employer to designate a requested leave as 
“FMLA leave,” even if the employee has not requested “FMLA leave” by name.90  The 
employer is also required to seek the information necessary to make this determination 
from the employee if needed.91  Employers generally may not retroactively designate 
leave as FMLA leave.92
 
In addition, under regulations covering employers who offer more generous benefits 
than those under the FMLA, employers must observe any internal policies that offer more 
generous benefits, and may not diminish FMLA rights through internal company 
policies.93  Employers are not required, however, to extend FMLA entitlements (such as 
maintenance of health benefits) to additional leave periods offered by employers but not 
covered by the FMLA.94
 
Finally, according to the regulations, an employer may not count leave as FMLA leave 
in certain circumstances if the employer has not provided proper notice to the employee 
that the leave will count as FMLA leave.95  These regulations have been challenged 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale.96  
 
Pre-Ragsdale, some courts affirmed the right of employers to impose FMLA leave on 
employees even if they did not request it, if FMLA-qualifying conditions were met.97
Significant case law, including a split amongst the circuit courts, also exists regarding 
the various remedial regulations that prohibit an employer from counting leave as 
FMLA leave until it gives notice to the employee that leave is FMLA-qualifying. 98 As 
discussed above, the Supreme Court in Ragsdale invalidated one of these regulations, 29 
C.F.R. § 825.700(a)(related to more generous employer leave policies), but left open the 
question of how its holding applied to other FMLA notice and remedy provisions.   
 
Post-Ragsdale, some courts have interpreted the decision narrowly, declining to apply it 
to other FMLA provisions.99  Other courts have not only applied Ragsdale to 29 C.F.R. § 
                                                 
90 29 C.F.R. §825.208(a). For intermittent or reduced leave, only one such notice is required unless the 
leave circumstances have changed.  Id. 
91 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a), 825.302(c), 825.303(b).  The designation must be based solely on information 
from the employee or the employee’s spokesperson (e.g., if the employee is incapacitated).  Id.  Employers 
may also request medical certification to verify the existence of a “serious health condition.”  29 C.F.R. § 
825.302(c).  See Workplace Flexibility 2010, Eligibility for Medical Leave Under the FMLA (2004). 
92 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(d)&(e). 
93 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a). 
94 Id. 
95 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), 825.700(a). 
96 See, e.g., Katekovich v. Team Rent a Car of Pittsburgh, 36 Fed. Appx. 688, 691, 2002 WL 1288766 (3d 
Cir. 2002); Farina v. Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Ariz. 2003); Roberson v. Cendant 
Travel Services, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
97 See, e.g., Havender v. Norton Co., 1997 WL 793085 at 7 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
98  See, e.g., Plant v. Morton International, Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000); Ragsdale v. Wolverine 
Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir 2000). 
99 See, e.g., Conti v. CSX International, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2520 (E.D.Pa 2003)(finding on issue of 
disregarding employer testimony that Ragsdale “holds nothing more than the voiding of this specific 
regulation [29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a)], which was not at issue; court noted that employer was inferring from 
the Ragsdale holding “additional legal principles that may become part of the FMLA legal landscape down 
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825.700(a), but also extended the reasoning of Ragsdale to apply to other FMLA notice 
and remedy provisions, including 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 (providing for designation of 
FMLA leave and substitution of paid leave for FMLA leave, and prohibiting employers 
from counting leave as FMLA leave prior to notice to employees of their designation that 
paid leave is being substituted for FMLA leave). 100  Relying on Ragsdale, the courts 
have generally required a showing that an employee was prejudiced or harmed by the 
lack of notice.101  Courts generally do not find harm if the employee is unable to return to 
work at the end of the leave period.102
 
Employer or Employee Notice of Substitution of Leave 
 
Many (although not all) employers offer their employees paid leave in the form of 
vacation, personal, family, medical or sick leave. The FMLA does not require paid sick 
leave when an employer does not normally provide it.103  Under the statute, when an 
employer makes paid leave days available to its employees, the employer may require 
that an employee substitute the paid leave days for the FMLA-qualifying days.104 An 
employee may also choose, on his or her own initiative, to substitute the employer-
provided paid leave days for the statutorily provided unpaid FMLA leave days.105 Thus 
the 12 weeks of FMLA unpaid leave will not accrue in addition to an employee’s existing 
paid leave days if an employer requires or the employee requests to substitute paid leave 
for FMLA leave.  
 
According to the committee reports, Congress included paid leave substitution 
provisions in the FMLA in order to “mitigate the financial impact of wage loss due to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the line.”; court denied reconsideration of denial of summary judgment for employer); Schmauch v. Honda 
of Am. Mfg., 259 F. Supp.2d 823 (S.D. Ohio 2003)(finding employer’s reliance on Ragsdale to support 
summary judgment on damages issue misplaced when Ragsdale concerned regulation that “relieved 
employees of the burden of proving any real impairment of their rights and resulting prejudice” while 
regulations at issue (29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b)(&(c)) each provided employees with ways to prove 
impairment of rights, not to circumvent the requirement to do so; court denied summary judgment for 
employer and for employee). 
100 See, e.g., Katekovich v. Team Rent a Car of Pittsburgh, 36 Fed. Appx. 688, 691, 2002 WL 1288766 (3d 
Cir. 2002); Smith v. Blue DOT Servs. Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Kan. 2003).  Some of these courts have 
acknowledged that the Ragsdale holding was limited to a single regulation, but applied its reasoning to 
other regulations based on the similarity, or similar effect, of the provisions.  Other courts have merely 
extended the holding without mentioning its explicitly narrow focus. 
101 See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004); Wright v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 2004 WL 1087359 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Sims v. Schultz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 
2004); Felder v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22535 (E.D.La 2003). 
102 See, e.g., Katekovich v. Team Rent a Car of Pittsburgh, 36 Fed. Appx. 688, 691, 2002 WL 1288766 (3d 
Cir. 2002); Roberson v. Cendant Travel Services, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d (M.D. Tenn. 2002); Hill v. Steven 
Motors, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Kan. 2002), aff’d by Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc., 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 8849 (10th Cir. Kan., May 5, 2004). This result is consistent with another FMLA regulation, 29 
C.F.R. § 825.214, which provides that if an employee is unable to perform an essential function of the 
position, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA, although the 
Americans with Disabilities Act may apply. 
103 29 U.S.C. §2612(d)(2)(B). 
104 29 U.S.C. §2612(d)(2)(A)&(B). If paid leave is provided for fewer than 12 weeks, the additional leave 
to equal the 12-week FMLA entitlement may be unpaid. 29 U.S.C. §2612(d)(1). 
105 29 U.S.C. §2612(d)(2)(A)&(B). 
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family and temporary medical leaves.”106  The substitution provisions also assured that 
an employee was entitled to the benefits of applicable paid leave plus any remaining 
leave time available through the FMLA’s unpaid leave entitlement.107  Congress, 
however, reiterated in the committee reports that nothing in the FMLA required an 
employer to provide paid sick leave in any situation where it normally did not do so.108  
 
Under the regulations, employers must give employees notice that paid leave must be 
substituted for FMLA leave within two days of employee notice of the need for 
leave.109  In addition, the regulations state that paid leave will not count as FMLA 
leave until notice of such substitution has been given.110  This regulation has been 
challenged following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale.111
 
If the employee does not elect or the employer does not require the employee to 
substitute paid leave for FMLA leave, the employee remains entitled to all of the paid 
leave earned under the employer policy.112  Similarly, if paid leave is not FMLA-
qualified leave, the employee retains his/her full 12-week FMLA leave entitlement.113  
 
Pre-Ragsdale, some courts noted the complexity of the substitution provisions and gave 
leeway to the employee when determining whether proper notice was given that paid 
leave would be substituted for unpaid FMLA leave.114  Following Ragsdale these cases 
may no longer be controlling.  Post-Ragsdale, some courts have invalidated 29 C.F.R. § 
825.208(c), which denies employers the right to count leave as FMLA-leave prior to 
giving employees notice that paid leave has been designated as FMLA leave.115  
 
Employee Notice of Intent to Return to Work 
 
The statute allows an employer to require an employee on FMLA leave to report 
periodically on the employee’s status and intent to return to work.116  According to 
the committee reports, Congress intended to limit the frequency of these periodic status 
reports to “reasonable intervals.”117  Notably, an amendment to the legislation 
                                                 
106 H.R. Rep. 103-8(I)(1993), at 38; S.Rep. 103-3 (1993), at 24.  
107 Id. When paid leave of less than 12 weeks’ duration is substituted for unpaid leave “the employer need 
only provide an additional period of unpaid leave so that the total of paid and unpaid leave provided equals 
12 weeks.”  Id. 
108 Id. 
109 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). 
110 Id. 
111 Phillips v. Leroy-Somer North America, et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5349 (W.D. Tenn.  2003). 
112 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(f). 
113 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(g). 
114 See, e.g., Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2001); Blankenship v. 
Buchanan General Hospital, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 832 (W.D.Va 1998). 
115 See, e.g., Phillips v. Leroy-Somer North America, et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5349 (W.D. Tenn.  
2003). 
116 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(5). 
117 S.Rep. 103-3(1993), at 27. 
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introduced by FMLA opponents requiring advance notice of an employee’s return to 
work failed.118   
 
The regulations add that employers may require periodic reports so long as their 
policies are not discriminatory and take into account all relevant facts and 
circumstances regarding the employee’s leave situation.119  The employer is not 
required to maintain the employee’s health benefits or hold open the employee’s job 
for him/her if an employee tells the employer unequivocally that he/she will not return 
to work.120  In addition, the employer may require notice generally within two business 
days of a change in circumstances (e.g., when an employee needs more leave than 
anticipated or decides to return to work earlier than anticipated).121  The employee, 
however, may not be required to take more leave than necessary to resolve the 
circumstances that required the leave in the first place.122
 
DOL explained that the two-day advance notice requirement balanced two conflicting 
interests: that of the employee to take no more FMLA leave than necessary, and that of 
the employer to obtain “reasonable advance notice of changed circumstances.”123  
Accordingly, DOL decided that “employees may be required to report periodically on 
their status and intent to return to work….”124  At the same time, DOL limited the 
frequency of the reports, noting the “intent of the statute and the regulations that 
employers not use the entitlement to require status reports in a manner that is burdensome 
and disruptive to the employee while on FMLA leave … such requests [should] be 
reasonable under the existing circumstances.”125  
 
Few cases regarding notice of intent to return to work have reached the courts.  Courts 
have generally confirmed the regulatory requirement that employees provide two days 
notice of their planned return.126
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The FMLA places notice requirements on both employers and employees.  These 
provisions help ensure communication between the parties regarding employee leave to 
allow both sides to plan for the employee’s absence.  The Supreme Court indicated in 
Ragsdale, however, that, with respect to one particular FMLA remedial provision, 
employers could not be penalized for failure to follow certain FMLA notice requirements 
without some showing of harm to the affected employee.  Since Ragsdale, the validity of 
                                                 
118 H.R. Rep. 103-8(I)(1993)(minority views), at 75-76.  
H.R. Rep. 103-8(I)(1993)(minority views), at 70-71. 
119 29 C.F.R. § 825.309. 
120 29 C.F.R. § 825.309(b). 
121 29 C.F.R. § 825.309(c). 
122 Id. 
123 60 Fed. Reg. 2214. 
124 60 Fed. Reg. 2225. 
125 Id. 
126 See Hoge v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 2004 WL 2056227 (6th Cir. 2004).
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various FMLA notice and remedy provisions has been challenged under Ragsdale’s 
reasoning, with courts generally requiring this showing of prejudice or harm to the 
employee before providing relief when employers violate FMLA notice provisions.  
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